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1. Introduction 
The existing literature is clear that China is impacting on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). 
What is not clear is the precise nature of that impact. Does it come mainly from trade in 
cheap manufactured goods? Does it come from China’s seemingly insatiable hunger for 
oil and minerals? What countries benefit and in what sectors? What role do Chinese 
companies operating in Africa play? How beneficial is Chinese aid and/or international 
cooperation? Who is losing out, and why?  
 
Most of the literature focuses on trade but other interactions also generate positive or 
negative impacts. Of the many possibilities, we have identified foreign direct investment, 
production, and aid as potential channels of impact. In the following pages, we attempt 
first to take stock of our knowledge. We do by subjecting the most common forms of 
interaction between China and SSA to a comprehensive and detailed analysis using a 
systematic framework. We then use this analysis to identify the gaps in our knowledge 
and suggest ways of bridging them.  The paper uses secondary data from a number of 
sources, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the US Department 
of Commerce, as well as published materials and relevant websites. 
 
China’s relations with Africa in the modern era have passed through three distinct phases. 
The first phase followed the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955, and 
resulted in almost four decades of what might be termed “Third World Solidarity”. Partly 
driven by its ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union, China offered decolonising Africa 
moral and political support, in some cases coupled with limited military support and aid.4 
The period from the mid-1990s onwards – the subject of the analysis below – represents 
the second phase of Chinese involvement with SSA. Following a substantial growth in 
China’s trade with Africa, and China’s growing need for resources, large and 
predominantly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) entered SSA as investors and as 
contractors to Chinese-aid-funded projects in infrastructure and public buildings. The 
third and emergent phase of Chinese interaction with SSA is one involving small and 
medium sized, predominantly private-sector, enterprises. These comprise a mixture of 
firms. Some are incorporated in China and have extended their operations from China to 
SSA. Others have been started ab initio in SSA.  
 
These largely coordinated sallies into SSA have led many observers to characterise China 
as “having a strategy for Africa”, not least in the context of the three-yearly Forum on 
China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences. (A mirroring characterisation is that 
whilst China may have a strategy for Africa, Africa lacks a strategy for China). The 
fourth and currently emerging phase of Chinese interaction with Africa is one in which 
small and medium sized enterprises, often started by Chinese who had previously been 
employed in large scale investments by SOEs, have broken away from the coordinated 
pack of interventions and act as largely autonomous entrepreneurs (Mohan and Kale, 
2007; Gu, 2009) 
 
                                                 
4
 The most visible project was the Tanzam railway linking Zambia with Tanzania in an attempt to free 
Central Africa from dependency on Apartheid South Africa’s transport infrastructure. 
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2. Framework for Analysing Impact 
Although there are a number of channels through which China’s impacts may be 
transmitted, we focus on three main channels that appear to be particularly pertinent at 
the present time: 1) trade flows; 2) FDI flows, technology transfer and integration in 
global value chains; and 3) aid flows. There may also be impacts transmitted through the 
environment, financial flows, or participation in institutions of regional and global 
governance (IDS, 2006).  
 
In each channel, China-SSA relations may be either complementary or competitive (or 
indeed both). In trade, for example, China may provide SSA with appropriate capital 
goods and cheap consumer goods, and SSA may supply China with the commodities it 
requires to fuel its continued economic expansion. The relationship is complementary 
because both countries gain from it. However, imports of consumer goods to SSA may 
displace local producers, leading to sectorally competitive impacts on workers and 
entrepreneurs.  
 
The distinction between the direct and indirect impacts is less obvious, and its 
significance is less widely recognised. Direct impacts through charting direct trade flows 
between China and SSA are relatively simple, clear, and easily measured. The indirect 
impacts occur as a result of China’s relations with third countries, working their way 
indirectly through to SSA. For example, China’s demand for commodities may raise their 
global prices, and even though a country like Ethiopia does not export animal feed to 
China (a direct relationship), it sells animal feeds into a global market in which prices 
have been raised by China’s growing imports (indirect impact). The indirect impacts of 
China on SSA are sometimes much more substantial than the direct impacts. However, 
almost all of the analysis of the impact of China on SSA focuses on direct, bilateral 
relations, and hence tends to miss these important issues. 
 
Figure 1 integrates these three sets of factors into a synthetic framework to assess the 
overall impact of China on SSA. As will be shown below, our attempt to complete this 
synthetic matrix has resulted in several empty cells, and it is unclear to what extent this 
represents the pattern of China’s impact on SSA or the underdeveloped state of our 
knowledge on these impacts. 
 
Figure 1. A Synthetic Framework for Assessing the Impact of China on SSA 
 
Channel Impact 
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary   
 
Trade 
Competitive   
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary   
 
Production and FDI  
Competitive   
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary   
 
Aid 
Competitive   
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3. Channels of Impact 
Trade 
One of the main features of China’s rapid growth has been its deepening trade 
orientation, with the trade-GDP ratio in excess of 70 percent, well above the “norm” for 
large countries. Within this, China has become a major exporter of manufactures and a 
significant importer of commodities. Trade between China and SSA is a small proportion 
of each region’s total trade, but its rapid growth suggests that the trade channel is a 
significant source of impact. Trade values quintupled from close to $10 billion in 2002 to 
more than $40 billion in 2005, to more than $50 billion by 2007 and rising by 46% to 
$109 billion in 2008.. 
 
Table 1. Trade with China as a Proportion of Trade with Industrialised Countries (%) 
 
  
1990 1997 2001 2005 2006 2007 
SSA Exports to China 0.56 4.08 6.46 15.01 17.82 19.48 
SSA Imports From China 2.60 5.50 9.78 17.86 20.29 25.65 
 
Source: Calculated from IMF Dots, Accessed 17th February 2009.  
 
In 1990 SSA’s exports to China were less than one per cent of its exports to industrialised 
countries, but by 2007 this percentage had risen to 19 per cent. Similarly SSA’s imports 
from China, which were 2.6  per cent of its imports from industrialised countries in 1990, 
had risen to over 25 per cent by 2007. Since 2001, imports from China have been 
expanding more slowly than exports, allowing SSA’s trade balance with China to turn 
from negative to positive (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2008).  
 
SSA’s exports to China are mainly fuelled by China’s growing demand for commodities 
(Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2008). The share in total SSA commodity exports to China of 
oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds and logs grew from less than 50 percent to more than 80 
percent between 1995 and 2005. The overwhelming bulk and most rapidly-growing 
export was oil. SSA manufactured exports to China were mostly from South Africa. But 
even in this case, nearly all products were derived from basic metals. Whilst Africa is in 
trade surplus with China in aggregate, its non-oil trade is in sharp deficit. 
 
For some SSA economies, the importance of China as a direct destination of exports 
grew particularly rapidly.  Exports to China account for between 86 and 100 percent of 
all oil exports for Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, and Congo. A similar picture is true for the 
DRC, which sends 99.6 percent of its basic metal exports to China.  On the import side, 
only seven SSA countries source a significant share of their total imports from China. In 
2007 the most import-dependent SSA economies on China were Angola (33 percent of 
imports), S Africa (19 percent), Sudan (13 percent) and the DRC (8 percent) (Kaplinsky 
and Farooki, 2008) Almost all were manufactured products.  
 
What about potential bilateral trade between China and SSA? The evidence on the direct 
trade links suggests that, on the export side, SSA gains from China’s demand for 
commodities, and on the import side, it gains cheap and appropriate consumer and capital 
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goods. Outside of textiles, timber and cotton, there appears to be little trade between 
China and SSA in intermediate goods and little incorporation of China and SSA into 
coordinated global value chains. Jenkins and Edwards (2006) argue that most of these 
imports into SSA have substituted for imports from outside of SSA, with the possible 
exception of Ethiopia and Nigeria, suggesting little displacement of domestic production 
and few negative impacts on employment and local production. These conclusions 
suggest a synergistic link between SSA and China, reflecting the optimism prevailing in 
some circles on the potential opportunities opened for SSA by China’s rapid trade 
expansion (World Bank 2004b). 
 
However, we suggest three major reasons for more cautious conclusions. The analyses of 
Jenkins and Edwards and the World Bank are conducted on 3-digit SITC trade data. 
Whilst this shows notable aggregate trends, it hides some important specific impacts 
which only show up with different, firm-level methodologies. For example, domestically 
produced clothing and furniture manufactures in both Ghana and South Africa are being 
displaced by imports from China (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). Similar anecdotal 
evidence can be found with regard to clothing and footwear manufacture in many SSA 
economies. In Ethiopia, a study of 96 micro, small and medium domestic producers 
reported that as a consequence of Chinese competition, 28 percent were forced into 
bankruptcy, and 32 percent downsized activity. The average size of micro enterprises fell 
from 7 to 4.8 employees, and of SMEs, from 41 to 17 (Tegegne 2007).   
 
Of greater concern are the potential effects on future production. Here, particularly in the 
case of light consumer goods, there are important and adverse long-term implications for 
SSA industrialisation (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). What “spaces” will they be able to 
move into as their economies grow and they seek to diversify? 
 
However, the most important indicator of caution stems from the indirect impact of 
China’s trade with SSA. China’s trade footprint is so large that it is in itself altering 
global prices, and this has significant impacts on SSA. The problem is that these indirect 
trade impacts are much more difficult to analyse, which is why almost all of the analysis 
so far has been on the growth and impact of direct trade links. 
 
Most assessment of the impact of indirect trade links have focused on their effects on 
product prices (Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino 2006), the similarity (or lack of it) between 
SSA’s and China’s exports (Jenkins and Edwards 2006), and the identification of winners 
and losers from trade with China (Stevens and Kennan (2006). The fact that these have 
been done at fairly high levels of trade aggregation tends to mask the severity of China’s 
indirect impact on SSA manufactured exports.  The actual impacts are better seen by 
examining particular sectors and products.  
 
By far the most significant recent manufactured export from SSA has been clothing and 
textiles, largely as a result of United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
preferences. Table 2 shows not just significant export growth, but growing reliance on the 
US market. For some SSA economies, these rapidly-growing exports have become 
especially significant. In 2002 clothing and textile exports accounted for 50 percent of 
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Lesotho’s GDP. In Kenya, in 2004 employment in the clothing EPZ enterprises was 
equivalent to 20 percent of formal sector manufacturing employment. 
 
Table 2: Growth of SSA Clothing and Textile Exports, 2000-2007 
 
  World US% share 
Kenya 2004 326,959 90.5 
 2005 301,505 89.9 
 2006 311,210 89.9 
 2007 289,239 90.5 
Lesotho 2004 496,953 97.0 
 2005 415,671 94.0 
 2006 433,286 94.0 
 2007 431,624 93.2 
Madagascar 2004 577,637 59.9 
 2005 538,212 51.6 
 2006 593,652 42.8 
 2007 684,103 45.0 
Mauritius 2004 1,023,068 23.5 
 2005 850,242 19.7 
 2006 897,603 14.0 
 2007 977,916 12.4 
Swaziland 2004 200,031 94.3 
 2005 169,814 94.8 
 2006 147,638 96.3 
 2007 146,912 96.7 
South Africa 2004 932,950 20.2 
 2005 727,791 14.0 
 2006 633,240 14.9 
 2007 458,780 13.4 
Source: COMTRADE database accessed via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 19th 
September 2008 
 
 
The primary driver for these growing clothing and textile exports has been trade 
preferences in general and the US AGOA preference scheme in particular.  AGOA’s 
derogation on the rules of origin allows SSA exporters to import inputs from outside of 
the AGOA region or the US.5 This derogation has been extended on a number of 
occasions to 2012. The derogation has allowed countries with weak or non-existent 
textile industries to boost employment and exports through clothing production. 
 
The final integration of the textile sector into WTO rules involved the removal of all 
quotas, effective 1 January 2005. This opened the US market to imports from China, 
which had previously been subject to quotas. All of the countries that had been exporting 
textiles under AGOA experienced a decline in exports following the removal of quotas. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of quota-removal has not been quite as catastrophic as many 
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  Only South Africa is excluded from the derogation on the rules of origin.  
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had anticipated. By value, overall AGOA textile exports fell by 26 percent between 2004 
and 2006 (www.agoa.info). Kenya fared best, with its 2006 exports at 95 per cent of their 
2004 value. Lesotho, Swaziland, and Madagascar had 2006 exports of 85, 75, and 73 per 
cent of 2004 values respectively. By contrast, partly as a result of falling unit-prices, 
China’s share in the same product markets increased, suggesting a direct exclusionary 
impact by China on SSA in third-country markets (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). 
 
The main reason why SSA’s overall export performance was not as bad as expected 
relates to the degree of effective subsidy offered to AGOA producers in the US. The 
nominal rates of tariff on the clothing products which AGOA countries export to the US 
range between 16 and 32 percent. However, in nearly all cases AGOA clothing products 
can use (duty-free) fabrics and other inputs from outside of SSA in manufacturing their 
clothing. These imported inputs account for up to 60 percent of costs. Therefore, the 
implicit “effective rate of subsidy” is substantially higher than the nominal rates of 
protection would suggest. These effective rates range between 27 and 84 percent for 
representative exported products (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). 
 
This rate of subsidy allows AGOA clothing producers to compete in the US market. This 
is because scales are low in SSA plants, and many SSA economies suffer from poor 
bureaucratic and physical infrastructure. But there is also pervasive evidence that many 
SSA clothing plants have low levels of productivity because of poor organisational 
procedures, low levels of skill and inadequate management within plants (Manchester 
Trade Team, 2005; Barnes, Morris and Gastrow, 2006). 
 
The impact of competition from China in third-country markets on poverty and 
livelihoods is very substantial. Some of this is positive, insofar as reduced prices of 
clothing imports enhances the consumption power of consumers. But the negative 
impacts are also very significant. With minimal backward linkages into textiles, the major 
conduit for income-dispersal in the clothing industry has been through direct 
employment. The scale of job-losses arising from the end of MFA quotas is alarming 
(Table 3).6 It is not just the degree of job loss, but the nature of the jobs which have gone. 
Most workers are women, hence severe impacts on families, and in the absence of 
alternative employment, this decline has major poverty implications. We also know from 
global experience that rapid economic growth can be a significant factor in reducing 
poverty levels, and the loss to both GDP and exports arising from a sharp contraction of 
the clothing sector will have a further negative impact on poverty levels. 
 
Table 3. Employment Decline in Clothing Sector, 2004-2005 
 2004 2005 % decline 
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3 
Lesotho 54,000 40,000 25.9 
Swaziland 28,000 16,000 42.9 
                                                 
6
  South African job losses have been excluded from Table 3 as they are due to a complex web of 
factors leading to a lack of international competiveness: exclusion from AGOA derogation, an 
appreciating exchange rate, high labour costs, inefficient production, surge in Chinese and other 
imported clothing an fabric. 
 7 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008 
 
The employment decline largely omits employment losses in micro and small units for 
which exact numbers are not readily available. Chinese clothing imports have not only 
reduced domestic production, but have also displaced imports from neighbouring 
countries, many of which were previously produced by small-scale tailors, dressmakers, 
and knitters (for Kenya, see McCormick et al. 2007).  
  
FDI and Production 
Chinese investment in Africa has also increased dramatically, driven by both resource 
and market considerations. Although our data on FDI is more limited than on trade, we 
piece together a rough picture of Chinese investments in Africa.7 There was little Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa until around 1990. Then from $20 million per 
year in the early 1990s, Chinese FDI in Africa jumped to close to $100 million in 2000 
and reached more than $1 billion in 2006 (Zafar 2007). This represents a growth rate 
higher than Chinese FDI to any other part of the world.  
 
Chinese FDI is qualitatively different in kind from European and North American 
sourced FDI. Historically, Western and Japanese FDI in SSA has come from privately-
owned corporations focused on profit maximisation, generally with relatively short time-
horizons. By contrast, much of Chinese FDI in SSA comes from wholly or partially state-
owned firms with access to very low-cost capital, and operating with much longer time-
horizons. Many Chinese investments are linked to achieving strategic objectives, focused 
on long-term access to raw materials, and closely bundled with aid. 
 
Furthermore, Chinese FDI is at least partly driven by an active government policy 
(UNCTAD 2007). Currently Chinese companies enjoy four types of incentives: special 
and general tax incentives, credit and loans, foreign exchange allowances, and a 
favourable import and export regime. China’s FDI to Africa has been further supported 
by common efforts by the Chinese and African governments, such as high level 
government and business visits, meetings, summits, joint committees, bilateral 
agreements, and various investment promotion activities.  
 
Chinese FDI mainly takes the form of equity joint ventures with local entrepreneurs 
and/or national parastatals (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005; UNCTAD 2007). Some 
are multi-million-dollar joint ventures with local counterparts - in the energy and resource 
sectors, in Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, Mali, and Zambia, and in manufacturing, 
including textile factories in Tanzania and Nigeria, and soya and prawn processing in 
Mozambique (UNCTAD 2007; Bosten 2006). In other cases, the investment and scale of 
operations are much smaller. In some SSA economies, small-scale entrepreneurial 
investment is presaged by the construction of specialised shopping malls retailing 
Chinese goods.  
 
                                                 
7
  There are two official sources of data on FDI from China: the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The most recent detailed analysis of 
Chinese outward FDI has been provided by UNCTAD (2007) using both of these sources. 
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The Chinese have become highly visible in infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. 
Here it is not clear how much Chinese economic activity in SSA comprises FDI, how 
much is a result of winning commercial tenders, how much is linked to Chinese aid, and 
how much is part of integrated production networks between Chinese and SSA firms. 
Participation in infrastructure and construction projects ranges from stadiums in West 
Africa, to Presidential Palaces (in Kinshasa), dams (a $650m tender for Nile River 
Merowe Dam project), pipelines (Sudan), roads, railways and government buildings.   
 
By 2005, the Chinese had invested in 48 African countries (UNCTAD 2007). Table 4 
shows the number of projects and investment amounts for the top fourteen recipients. 
Zambia, South Africa, Mali, and Tanzania top the list, with the remaining countries 
receiving relatively small amounts.  
 
Table 4. Top 14 SSA Countries Receiving Chinese FDI (1979-2001) 
Investments Investment Amount Country 
No. % Thousand US$ % 
Zambia 17 3.8 134,126 18.5 
South Africa 83 18.5 110,849 15.3 
Mali 5 1.1 58,122 8.0 
Tanzania 14 3.1 39,483 5.4 
Zimbabwe 11 2.5 33,257 4.6 
Nigeria 33 7.4 31,144 4.3 
D.R. Congo 7 1.6 24,242 3.3 
Ghana 17 3.8 19,212 2.6 
Kenya 21 4.7 18,475 2.5 
Gabon 11 2.5 17,045 2.3 
Benin 4 0.9 16,723 2.3 
Mauritius 20 4.5 16,657 2.3 
Cote d’Ivoire 13 2.9 16,033 2.2 
Cameroon 15 3.3 15,851 2.2 
Africa total 448  726,532  
Source: World Bank, 2004a 
 
 
Most SSA investment in China comes from South Africa, with a number of large South 
African firms having a growing presence. This includes SABMiller (now the world’s 
second largest brewing company), which has invested more than $400m in China since 
1994, and has equity in 30 local breweries (Goldstein, 2004). Other large investors are 
SASOL, joining local Chinese investors in two very large coal-to-petroleum plants (each 
at more than $3bn) in the North West Province of China, Kumba Resources (part of 
Anglo American) in the production of zinc, SAPPI (also Anglo American, in paper), 
Polifin in chemicals and ABSA and NEDCOR in the financial sector. 
 
Aid 
Since the 1990s China’s aid is increasingly directed towards broad strategic goals of 
developing links with resource-rich SSA economies (Muekalia 2004; Kaplinsky et al. 
2007; Brookes and Shin 2006; Pan 2006; Tull 2006). China’s Africa Policy, adopted in  
2006, bases China-Africa relations on five principles: Sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, 
solidarity, and common development. It also reiterates the one-China principle as the 
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political foundation for the establishment and development of China’s relations with 
African countries and regional organisations (China 2006a; Guoqiang 2007). This was 
further elaborated in the Beijing Summit (November 2006), which affirmed “a new type 
of strategic partnership” between China and Africa (King 2006).  
 
Chinese aid to SSA can be grouped into six categories. The first is financial assistance for 
key investments. As of mid-2005, the Chinese government had provided aid to 
approximately 800 individual projects. Second, and linked to the first, China cancelled 
$1.2 billion in debts owed by 31 African countries in 2004, and has continued to use debt 
relief as an aid tool. Third China’s African Human Resources Development Fund had 
provided training in China to 9,400 Africans by the end of 2004, and a further 3,800 
places were planned for each of 2005 and 2006. 15,600 scholarships were offered to 52 
SSA countries in 2005 (China 2006b). Fourth, China has provided technical assistance to 
SSA – more than 600 teachers and more than 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 52 
SSA countries, including 1,100 present at the end of 2004. Fifth, China has instituted a 
programme of tariff exemption for 29 SSA economies, covering 190 products, including 
food, textiles, minerals and machinery. The policy took effect at the beginning of 2005, 
and coverage has since been extended to 400 items. Finally, China has in very recent 
years begun to provide peace-keeping forces to SSA. 
 
Infrastructure aid is useful because of Africa’s general need for rehabilitation, expansion, 
and updating of infrastructure. Debt relief is valuable because resources freed up can be 
applied to other needs at the discretion of the government. Nevertheless, both have been  
controversial. Many infrastructure projects have been linked to resource extraction, and 
subject to criticism on environmental grounds. Some construction projects, like stadiums 
and government office buildings, have been seen as contributing little to long-term 
development or poverty reduction, not only because of the nature of the project, but also 
because they are tied to Chinese inputs and/or do not adhere to good labour practices. 
Debt relief, like general budget support, is most useful when the country has a clear 
development agenda into which the freed resources can be channelled. In its absence, 
debt relief runs the risk of wasting resources or propping up oppressive governments. 
 
More generally Chinese aid has been criticised for failing to pay attention to a range of 
issues pertaining to good governance, human rights, environmental protection, and social 
justice (Bosshard 2008; Zafar 2007; Oya 2006; Tull 2006).  There is evidence that this is 
beginning to change. China EXIM Bank, the country’s official export credit agency and 
major lender to Africa, adopted an environmental policy in November 2004 (Bosshard 
2008). Although still general, it is clearly a step in the right direction. The Chinese 
government is also moving cautiously towards greater collaboration with Western 
donors, especially around issues of environmental sustainability (Lancaster 2007). At the 
same time, it is clear that China does not want to lose its distinctive character as a donor 
with a special understanding and sympathy for Africa’s development challenges. How 
this will be worked out, especially in the areas of human rights and social justice, remains 
to be seen (McCormick 2008). 
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Channels in Aggregate 
These channels are inter-related. China’s trade impact (direct and indirect) in clothing 
and textiles, for example, is closely linked to the integration of SSA and Chinese firms in 
coordinated global value chains, and China’s growing aid programme appears to be 
closely related to its need for traded commodities.  
 
We also noted a great danger of focusing on the present, the known and the measurable 
impacts. Moreover, partly because there is a great need to search for a solution to SSA’s 
problems, and partly because the direct bilateral links are easier to see than the indirect, 
there is a danger of focusing unduly on the positive opportunities and neglecting the 
potentially negative disruptive impacts of China’s growing impact on SSA. 
 
What can be said in aggregate about China’s impact on SSA? Figure 2 presents some of 
the major conclusions emerging from our review of the three key channels:  
 
• We are unable to fill all the “cells” in this framework. For example, it is possible 
that there will be indirect complementary effects in the FDI/production channel, 
and it is conceivable that Chinese-coordinated global value chains producing in 
the Middle East may source inputs from plants located in SSA. Does this inability 
to fill cells reflect the absence of impacts, unmeasured impacts, or poorly 
manifested impacts? 
 
• Direct impacts are easily evidenced, both with regard to complementary and 
competitive effects. By contrast, indirect impacts are more difficult to evidence 
and much more difficult to measure. 
 
• Data on the trade channel is much better than the production/FDI and aid 
channels. Is this a function of our lack of knowledge and/or the availability of 
global trade data, or does the trade impact assert itself first and most significantly? 
 
• With the exception of competitive effects in manufacturing through the trade 
channel, the balance of existing evidence tends to support the view that the 
positive impacts (“opportunities”) are probably more important than the negative 
impacts (“threats”). But it is unclear whether this is a function of the availability 
of evidence, or the real world.  
 
• It is difficult to generalise across countries and sectors. They might experience the 
impacts in each of these three channels in very different ways. For example, 
commodity exporters in SSA may gain from rising commodity prices 
(complementary indirect effects), whilst SSA commodity importers may suffer 
from the very same price rise (competitive indirect effects). Five economies 
account for more than 80 percent of all SSA’s oil and gas exports, 12 economies 
for more than 80 percent of mineral exports, and 22 economies for more than 80 
percent of agricultural exports. 
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• We have no available methodology for providing a “net outcome”, even for 
individual countries and regions. This is partly because some impacts are not 
measurable, and partly because they involve trade-offs between winners 
(consumers buying cheap clothing imports) and losers (displaced domestic 
producers of clothing), often within the same country. 
 
Figure 2: China and SSA: An Elaborated Synthetic View of Three Main 
Channels, and Complementary-Competitive and Direct-Indirect Impacts 
Impacts Channel 
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary • Inputs for industries 
• Cheap consumption goods 
• Higher global prices for SSA 
exports 
 
 
Trade 
 
Competitive 
• Displacement of existing and 
potential local producers by 
cheap Chinese products 
• Competition in external 
markets – falling prices and 
falling market shares 
 Direct Indirect 
 
 
 
Complementary 
• Chinese FDI in SSA, 
particularly in fragile states 
• Cheap and appropriate capital 
goods 
• Technology transfer 
• Integration in global value 
chains, particularly in clothing 
• Low-cost infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production 
and FDI  
 
 
Competitive 
• Displacement of existing and 
potential local producers 
• Less spin-off to local economy 
than other foreign contractors  
• Use of scarce resources 
• Competition for global FDI 
and production platforms 
• Disinvestment and relocation 
by other foreign investors (for 
example, clothing and furniture) 
 Direct Indirect 
Complementary • Grants and concessional 
finance 
• Technical assistance 
• Training 
• Tariff exemptions 
• Debt relief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid 
Competitive  Chinese aid to Latin America 
creates productive capacity 
which competes with SSA 
producers and lowers export 
prices 
 
 
4.  Drawing the issues together 
We now address the implications for policy in five key areas. We do not offer detailed 
prescriptions for change but, instead aim to see these as promoting the basis for 
discussions with key stakeholders, within SSA and China, and with interested 
organisations and multi-lateral agencies elsewhere. The key issues are: 
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1. The challenges posed to industrial policy and sectoral choice 
 
2. Reacting to changing patterns of poverty and income distribution 
 
3. Global and regional links 
 
4. Thinking about the future 
 
5. Filling the knowledge gaps 
 
Challenges posed to industrial policy and sectoral choice 
SSA is most clearly challenged by China’s impact on its industrial sector. China’s impact 
on SSA industrialisation arises from its growing exports affecting SSA on two related 
and threatening fronts – competition in internal markets for domestically-oriented 
manufacturers, and competition in external markets from export-oriented industry. 
 
Most is known about this in the clothing, textiles, furniture and footwear sectors. Chinese 
imports, are problematic for domestic manufacturers. Ghanaian furniture exporters find it 
increasingly difficult to compete with Chinese imports, as do South African clothing 
manufacturers (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). A similar pattern can be found in the 
Ethiopian footwear sector (Tegegne 2007) and the Kenyan clothing sector (Kamau 2007). 
Although data is scarce, discussions with manufacturers and retailers in a number of SSA 
economies with domestic manufacturing sectors suggest that import penetration is 
increasing in all markets, and in most of the traded-goods manufactured sectors. 
 
However, the challenge to SSA industry is much more substantial than these current 
impacts might suggest. This is because its industry is currently poorly developed, and 
often largely confined to the food-processing industry (where products degrade over time 
and have a high transport-to-value ratio), building materials (a high transport-to-value 
ratio and producing customised products) and the informal manufacturing sector 
(producing to low levels of quality and largely using waste materials). The real policy 
challenge is not to existing industry, but to potential industry: what space is there for SSA 
manufacturing to expand in the future? What implications does this have for the growth 
of dynamic capabilities, learning externalities and structural transformation? 
 
What can be done? First, there is scope for improving the productivity of existing 
industries, often by working with value chains rather than individual firms. Detailed firm-
level analysis of productivity in the clothing sector in South Africa (Barnes, Morris and 
Gastrow, 2006) and in COMESA (Manchester Trade Team, 2005) reveal the nature of 
these productivity gaps. Kaplinsky and Morris (2006) also report evidence of significant 
productivity improvements following the introduction of training schemes in Lesotho. 
Competitiveness in all sectors is a moving target, and for various reasons, few SSA 
industries have hitherto been able to address this challenge of building dynamic 
capabilities. There is, however, no intrinsic reason why this should be the case, and there 
is thus considerable scope for effective industrial policies. 
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Trade is a second area of policy intervention. Here there may be a need for selective 
protection on the import side. But, as we saw in the earlier discussion of AGOA exports, 
SSA requires continued preferential treatment against China in external markets. AGOA 
has been extended to 2012, but this remains a temporary solution. SSA governments 
would do well to develop active industrial policies that provide incentives to deepening 
value added in the textiles sector.  
 
A further important lesson is for SSA producers to be less concerned about the sector of 
production and more focused on identifying niches where they can build barriers to entry 
to Chinese producers through the development of innovative capabilities. In 
manufacturing this may be increasingly difficult as Chinese competences grow, whereas 
in horticulture and services, including knowledge-intensive services, relative capabilities 
may be high, as in the case of Kenya’s horticulture sector, South Africa’s medical sector, 
and East Africa’s wildlife tourism sector. 
 
Reacting to changing patterns of poverty and income distribution 
Trade-related income poverty and distribution impacts can be significant (McCulloch, 
Winters and Cirera (2002). Although little is known about the detailed impact on China’s 
trade on SSA patterns of income distribution, there are reasons to believe that it could be 
substantial. 
 
On the positive side, Chinese manufactured imports benefit consumers, particularly low-
income consumers. This is a global phenomenon, since the decline in prices of basic 
manufactures is a primary factor holding inflation at bay in many OECD economies. 
Many SSA manufacturers complain that Chinese products are displacing locally-
produced commodities. In many countries, the primary displacement effect is on imports 
of manufactures from other, non-SSA economies, with wholesalers and retailers 
switching their sourcing to cheap Chinese suppliers often with major positive impacts on 
consumer welfare. In South Africa, for example, whilst the overall price index increased 
by 30 percent between 2000 and 2005, that of clothing fell by five percent. Significantly, 
as in the case of the Ethiopian shoe industry, some of this price decline was due to lower 
cost imports from China but competition from Chinese manufactures also forced local 
manufacturers to upgrade their competitiveness (Morris, 2007).  
  
There are also rapidly-emerging negative consequences of Chinese trade on income 
distribution. On the one hand, employment in many labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors is being lost, not only in export-oriented enterprises, but also in micro and small 
units targeting the local market. On the other hand, the rise in commodity production is 
associated both with capital-intensive technologies, and because of the large-scale of 
commodity production, to highly-concentrated forms of ownership. This is not an 
intrinsic problem of all primary production, since many soft-commodities (tea, coffee, 
cotton and horticulture) are labour-intensive and locally-owned, But, hitherto, most 
commodity exports to China have been oil and hard commodities, particularly basic 
metals. 
 
 14 
There is an additional global dimension to these emerging patterns of income 
distribution, since manufacturing incomes are either largely local within SSA (labour) or 
flow to firms based in low- and middle-income Asian economies. By contrast, with the 
exception of South Africa, commodity production almost exclusively occurs through the 
operations of foreign transnational firms. A mitigating factor with regard to the 
distributional consequences of commodity production is that it is relatively easy to tax, 
providing revenues to governments. But the use of these state revenues does not 
necessarily suggest that their poverty and distributional impacts are positive. Moreover, a 
legacy of the Washington Consensus Structural Adjustment Programmes has been the 
transfer of many mines to foreign ownership, often coupled with tax holidays. 
Consequently, many of the fruits of the recent China-induced commodity-boom were lost 
to African countries. In Zambia, for example, little of the rise in copper prices accrued to 
domestic parties, least of all to the state coffers (Weekes, 2008) 
 
Global and regional integration 
Historically, most of SSA’s trade links have been with the former metropolitan powers, 
either directly with the UK and France, or more generally with Europe and North 
America. These links have been strengthened through the development of various forms 
of preferential trade arrangements (Lome-Cotonou, AGOA, EPAs and FTAs).  
 
Two major developments are disturbing these historical patterns. First, there appears to 
be a naturally growing regional market in southern Africa, reflecting regional 
externalities in production (Evans et. al., 2006). But, secondly, the rapid growth in trade 
between SSA and China suggests a growing “magnetic pull” from the East, posing a 
major policy challenge to SSA. In the context of stretched policy and administrative 
systems, and given the growing importance of regional ties in the global economy, who 
should they link with, and what forms of linkage might this involve? Should they aim to 
go North, go East or stay local? 
 
Here it is possible to distinguish between what might be termed “passive integration” and 
“active integration”. The former refers to the removal of barriers to trade, as in the case of 
FTAs and WTO-orchestrated multilateral trade liberalisation. Positive integration 
involves targeted policies focusing on particular forms of market imperfections (for 
example, promoting learning about China and its language), strengthening poor 
infrastructure constraining particular geographical links, and actively seeking to develop 
various forms of “deep integration” in China-SSA global value chains. It may also 
involve the development of particular patterns of trade preference, as in the recent 
Chinese initiative to lower tariffs on imports of manufactures from the least developed 
SSA economies. 
 
SSA economies need to develop explicit policies in these areas involving a “joined-up” 
mix of economic and political initiatives. As SSA loosens its links with Europe and North 
America, it will also be necessary for countries, to determine how much weight they wish 
to place on intra-continental regional links, and how much on forging new regional links 
with China and other Asian countries. 
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Thinking about the future – developing “dynamic capabilities” 
For SSA economies the capacity to change, to grasp opportunities and to minimise threats 
is critical - referred to as the development of “dynamic capabilities”. It involves a 
combination of search capabilities, strategic-formulation capabilities and implementation 
capabilities, as well as the capacity to change continually as new threats and opportunities 
arise. 
 
Many of the dynamic capabilities required to meet these challenges are prefigured in the 
policy-related issues discussed above. An additional capability is the ability of SSA 
producers to anticipate future opportunities and threats opened up by sustained Chinese 
expansion. For example, one emerging opportunity is the promotion of Chinese tourism. 
By 2006 China had granted tourist destination status to 26 African countries (People’s 
Daily Online, 6 November 2006). The number of Chinese tourists to Africa reached 
110,000 in 2005, doubling the 2004 figure. With the growth in Chinese per capita 
incomes, tourism will accelerate. This has clear links to the manufacturing sector in the 
form of opportunities for producers of many items needed to establish and operate a 
tourist destination - furniture, textiles, uniforms, processed food and beverages, soaps and 
cleaning supplies. 
 
Another possibility refers to China’s food needs. At 3,040, China’s per capita calorie 
consumption is on average 90 percent of that in the high income economies (Chen et al., 
2006), so future import needs are likely to reflect a change in the composition of food 
consumption rather than a significant increase in its volume. So far, China has sourced 
very little food from SSA, partly because it has imported intermediates such as animal 
feed to support its own meat-producing sector. Most of the feed imported so far has been 
soya, and the primary origin of these imports has been from Latin America (Jenkins, 
Dussel Peters and Moreira, 2006), and SSA has gained little from this trade in animal-
feeds.  
 
This raises a series of strategic issues for SSA food producers, which require careful 
consideration, informed by data rather than wild speculation. Will China continue to 
produce its own meat? Will its growing per capita income lead it to import horticultural 
products, fish and chicken? If so, will these imports come directly from eastern and 
southern African economies which have a demonstrated comparative advantage, or will 
SSA gain indirectly from Chinas growing imports from a supply-constrained global 
economy?  
 
These examples of tourism and soya are just that – examples. They represent future 
possibilities. At the same time, it is also necessary to anticipate future threats. A major 
potential problem for many SSA economies lies in the escalation of energy prices.  
Constrained global supplies and rapidly growing demand from China and India pushed 
prices far above previous estimates. So, too, the prices of other SSA imports, including 
food, might climb to new highs.  
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Filling the knowledge gaps 
We know more about the questions to be addressed than on the nature of China’s impact. 
There are significant knowledge gaps, and unless these are filled, policy and capability 
development will be undermined and may be misdirected.  
 
We can conclude with some confidence that the three primary channels of transmission 
are indeed trade, FDI/production and aid, and that we know more about the direct impacts 
than the indirect impacts. In order to understand China’s growing involvement in SSA, it 
is as important to focus on the geostrategic and political imperatives, as on the narrow 
pursuit of financial gain. But, other than this, we cannot at present draw any conclusions 
with confidence. We cannot assess whether on balance China’s impact is likely to be 
positive or negative, and for which countries and regions, and for which particular 
stakeholders in particular countries and regions.  
 
In order to establish a good foundation for policy development, key knowledge gaps 
suggest at least seven different types of research:   
 
1. Base-line studies to assess the changing future impact of China on SSA 
 
2. Analyses of the determinants of SSA competitiveness and the steps required to 
enhance productivity (for example, in clothing, textiles, footwear and furniture, as 
well as in export-oriented food crops). 
 
3. A more thorough assessment of indirect impacts of China’s trade on SSA, 
facilitating the development of appropriate policies for providing special and 
differential treatment to low income SSA economies in global markets. 
 
4. Studies aimed at determining the impact of China on consumer welfare, income 
distribution and absolute poverty levels in SSA, through an analysis of the 
consumer benefits derived from cheaper imports, and the distributional 
implications of a switch in specialisation away from labour-intensive 
manufactures to capital intensive commodities. 
 
5. Studies that distinguish generic from sub-regional and country-specific impacts, 
aiding the classification of different types of SSA economies 
 
6. An analysis of the extent of Chinese migrants in SSA, their origins, their sectors 
of  activity and their synergistic role with the entry of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises in Africa’s resource and infrastructure sectors. 
 
7. Research into likely future areas of threat and opportunity 
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Conclusions 
There is a growing realisation that China’s present and potential impact on SSA is both 
far-reaching and complex. Our synthetic framework, whilst disentangling the impact of 
three major channels and their various effects, has produced only a partial picture of 
China’s impact on SSA. This is at least partly because of gaps in our knowledge. Some of 
these gaps result from lack of data, but others arise because the organisation of Chinese 
society means that the channels are intertwined in ways not immediately obvious to 
outsiders. This appears to be especially true of the production and aid channels, but may 
also apply to trade. The result is that some potentially important areas of impact may be 
misunderstood or missed altogether. 
 
China’s public pronouncements convey a desire for a relationship of South-South 
cooperation, of one developing country helping another (King 2006). Such a two-way 
relationship can only be fruitful if both parties respect one another and are ready to listen 
and learn from each other’s experience. The relationship also needs to be underpinned by 
an understanding of how the actions of one are likely to affect the life of the other. Only 
then will genuine partnerships be possible. 
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